Successes and Limits of Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 by Cintra, Marcos Antonio Macedo
Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra 
Successes and Limits of Brazilian  
Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 
From January 1999 the Brazilian administration supported both by the 
international and the domestic financial community, together with the 
IMF, formulated a macroeconomic policy based on three pillars: a) a 
floating exchange rate and free capital mobility for the adjustment of 
external accounts; b) high real interest rates to ensure the achievement 
of inflation targets; c) increasing primary surplus to constrain public 
sector indebtedness. This macroeconomic model has proved to be able 
to bring forth economic cycles by following expansion and retraction 
movements in world trade and liquidity. However, it has not suc-
ceeded in putting the country back on a path to social and economic 
development. This path is meant as a consistent expansion of invest-
ments, especially higher and long-term ones (such as those in infra-
structure or heavy industry) or riskier ones (such as those with high 
technological content), along with employment increase, wage in-
creases and improved income distribution. 
This paper supports the thesis that exchange, monetary and fiscal 
policies with free capital mobility are contradictory and contribute to 
obstructing sustained growth, the elimination of external vulnerability, 
the tackling of infrastructure constraints, and the expansion of social 
expenditure. The paper is divided into four sections. The first part 
deals with the external account adjustment and the possible impacts of 
exchange rate valuation as from mid-2004 on. The second section 
analyses how inappropriate the inflation target policy is under domes-
tic pricing conditions. The third part describes the fiscal policy role, 
an adjustment variable of the macroeconomic model, since it bears the 
impacts of exchange rate and monetary policies. Final considerations 
outline possible alternative policies as an attempt to dismantle the 
vicious circle of the macroeconomic model with financial liberaliza-
tion. 
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1. Floating Exchange Rate and External Adjustment 
The three devaluation shocks of the Brazilian currency during this 
period (1999, 2001, and 2002) made possible a pronounced adjust-
ment of external accounts (see Chart 1 and 2). The balance of trade 
skyrocketed from a US$ 6.6 billion deficit in 1998 to a US$ 33.7 bil-
lion surplus in 2004. This resulted in a reversion in the current account 
balance from a US$ 33.4 billion deficit to an US$ 11.7 billion surplus. 
In 2004 the recovery in commodity prices – which rose by 17.5% on 
average – and the growth of 23.4% in manufacturing exports led to a 
higher trade balance despite an increase in imports. Encouraged by an 
extremely favorable international conjuncture, including 18% growth 
in world trade, low inflation rates, and near-zero or negative real in-
terest rates in major developed countries, Brazilian exports reached 
the level of US$ 96.5 billion. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
Chart 1 - Floating exchange rate (R$/US$)
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
The dynamism of the agribusiness (soya, meat, wood and its byprod-
ucts, sugar and alcohol, paper and cellulose etc.) along with the ex-
pansion of the agricultural frontier, genetic improvements sponsored 
by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and 
world economic growth was one of the factors which most contrib-
uted for the export boom. The agribusiness trade surplus totaled 
US$ 34.1 billion in 2004. It corresponds to a 32.1% growth when 
compared to the figures from the previous year. Another relevant fac-
tor was a change in strategies adopted by foreign corporations in the 
country: either their direct participation in foreign trade by exporting 
higher technological content products and in faster growing areas, or 
their association to or acquisition of local companies which stimulated 
reaction from Brazilian corporations (Baer/Cintra 2004). 
Foreign direct investment reached US$ 32.8 billion in 2000. It 
played a relevant role in the consolidation of external accounts, espe-
cially at moments of high levels of risk aversion in the international 
financial markets (see Chart 2). First, foreign corporations attempted 
to explore the potential growth in the domestic market. Only a few 
export strategies went beyond regional integration. An example is the 
automotive industry, in view of the constitution of the Mercosur 
(Southern Cone Common Market). Faced with persistent frustration 
with the poor performance of the Brazilian economy and the exchange 
rate devaluation, foreign corporations started to adopt a more active 
export strategy through expansion to new markets and redistribution 
of production lines among transnational affiliates. In a few cases the 
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domestic market scale and/or specialization derived from the dynam-
ics of the domestic market also implied export activities, including the 
field of higher technological content products. Thus, there was sales 
expansion in higher aggregate value manufactures, such as automobile 
parts, chassis, vehicles, tractors, planes, machinery, furniture, electro-
electronic products, pumps etc.1 
In sum, exporting efforts were combined not only with the oppor-
tunity to use idle productive capacity, but also with economies of 
scale, productivity increase, and some sort of technological catch-up. 
In addition to synergic gains, access to new markets and improve-
ments in distribution systems, exports by (foreign and domestic) cor-
porations have resulted in higher revenue in foreign currency, repre-
senting a hedge mechanism able to guarantee parts and components 
imports and the payment of foreign debts, and to reduce dependence 
on new loans abroad, since it contributes to an improved risk rating 
and opens up external credit lines in more favorable conditions. Fi-
nally, exports have become strategic for foreign and domestic compa-
nies. 
The total foreign debt dropped from US$ 241.5 billion in 1999 to 
US$ 220.2 billion in December 2004 (see Table 1). This movement 
has been led by long- and short-term private debt which fell from 
US$ 140.8 billion to US$ 105.5 billion as a result of corporate deci-
sions to reduce liabilities in foreign currency. This posture, especially 
from those companies which do not manufacture tradable goods, is 
                                                     
1  Furtado (2004: 4) supports that: “it can be stated that the Brazilian industrial 
fortress rests on metal-mechanics, which ranges from natural resources (minera-
tion) to iron and steel industry (natural resources and scale), and then mechanics 
(and a broad range of electrical equipment which can be classified in this type) to 
which different manufacturing processes are joined. Brazil built up solid posi-
tions in these sectors. […] Brazil has demonstrated itself to be competitive in 
mechanical and electrical equipment segments, both at a large/small scale and 
manufactured to order. Many of these companies export production shares larger 
than those of leading companies in the agroindustrial complex. In the Brazilian 
metal-mechanics industry there is already an element which was previously un-
known in these activities and in most industries: an export-oriented plant”. 
Transport materials industries (US$ 16 billion, 16.6% out of the total) and metal-
lurgic products (US$ 10.3 billion, 10.7% out of the total) have been leading ex-
ports, followed by the soy bean complex (US$ 10 billion, 10.4% out of the total) 
and meat (US$ 6.2 billion, 6.4% out of the total). The signing of trade agree-
ments with Chile and Mexico also helped promote sales of trucks, buses, and  
agricultural machinery. 
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associated with the perception of higher instability in global financial 
markets, exchange rate volatility, and precariousness of exchange rate 
hedge as a result of the reduced offer of exchange rate indexed public 
bonds. As a counterpart, the external public debt rose from US$ 100 
billion to US$ 114.7 billion. The reduction in debt stock favored an 
improvement in different external indicators of the Brazilian econ-
omy, such as interest payments/exports, debt service/exports, foreign 
debt/GNP, foreign debt/exports etc. (Prates 2004). However, antici-
pated amortizations totalling US$ 41 billion in 2005 and US$ 31 bil-
lion in 2006 maintain the need for high external funding. This requires 
the continuity of a policy for reduced dependence from extremely 
volatile international capital flows, since they are subject to euphoric 
and depressive moods. 
 
Table 1: Total foreign debt by debtor (US$ millions) 
Description 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Medium- and long-run  
   debt 
199.001 189.500 182.276 187.316 194.736 182.630 
   Non financial public  
   sector 
97.364 87.780 92.755 110.310 119.785 114.712 
   Financial private and  
   public sector 
101.637 99.720 89.521 77.005 74.950 67.918 
Short-run debt 26.609 27.420 27.658 23.395 20.194 18.744 
   Non financial public  
   sector 
3.318 2.578 427 110 11 1 
   Financial private and  
   public sector 
23.291 24.842 27.231 23.285 20.183 18.743 
Total foreign debt (A)2/ 225.610 216.921 209.934 210.711 214.930 201.375 
Intercompanies loans (B) 15.859 19.236 16.133 16.978 20.484 18.808 
Total foreign debt plus 
intercompanies loans 
(C=A+B) 
241.468 236.156 226.067 227.689 235.414
 
220.183 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Press release – external Sector, January 2005. 
Note: 1/ Excludes principal stock relative to intercompanies loans. It considers a 
revision in indebtedness position as from March 2001. 
 
The domestic interest rate increase as from September 2004, along 
with open capital accounts and a floating exchange rate, triggered 
rapid short-term capital inflows, which sought to make arbitrage 
among interest rates – while the US federal funds rate was 2.25% per 
year in December 2004, the Selic rate reached 17.75% per year – by 
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appreciating the Brazilian currency (see Chart 1). On the one hand, the 
currency overvaluation acts as an auxiliary mechanism for inflation 
control. Thus, it helps to achieve the 2005 inflation target. On the 
other hand, it jeopardizes the consistent increase in both trade and 
current account surpluses which helps stabilize the balance of pay-
ments and constrains foreign vulnerability. The currency overvalua-
tion forced the Central Bank and the Treasury to buy international 
reserves at the spot market, as well as to intervene in the derivative 
market (Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros, BM&F). It is estimated that 
US$ 7 billion were purchased on the exchange market from December 
2004 to January 2005. Net international reserves (excluding IMF re-
sources) rose to US$ 29 billion in early February 2005. However, 
reserve purchasing has an impact on the public debt stock if the Cen-
tral Bank decides to sterilize them, and/or on domestic liquidity (and 
therefore the GNP growth rate), if it decides for a non-sterilization 
policy. The first alternative proves to be contradictory to one of the 
macroeconomic policy goals, i.e. to reduce the net public debt-GNP 
ratio; the second alternative is contradictory to the pursuit of an infla-
tion target. The Central Bank chose the sterilization of the domestic 
currency by partially reversing efforts for public debt reduction during 
2004 in order to limit an excessive valuation of the Real. 
Despite the successful exporting strategy, Brazilian exports are 
still concentrated on agricultural and industrial commodities charac-
terized by high price and volume volatility. This fact makes exports 
strongly dependent on the dynamics of the international economy. 
Under these circumstances, a real exchange rate favoring exports and 
import replacement becomes crucial for a sustainable path to the Bra-
zilian economy. The appreciation of the Real combined with excessive 
exchange rate volatility may jeopardize the creation of expectations 
favorable to productive investment, particularly the export-oriented 
one. Thus, the appreciation of the Real threatens the sustainability of 
the dynamic export sector in the forthcoming years and makes it diffi-
cult to consolidate external adjustment. The constraint of short-term 
inflationary pressures associated with the prolonged and expressive 
currency valuation does not seem to offset the risk of future external 
imbalance. 
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2. Interest Rates and Inflation Targets 
In June 1999, after the currency crisis started on 13 January, an 
institutional framework was conceived for monetary policy: the 
inflation target regime. This policy aimed to replace the exchange rate 
as an anchor, which was effective during the first phase of the Real 
Plan (1994-1998) for a system which was able to affect the demand 
level and expectations of economic agents by means of simple and 
automatic interest rate management rules. The Brazilian inflation 
target regime was established as follows: 
– the Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA) calculated by the 
IBGE Foundation has been selected as the price index to deter-
mine the achievement of an inflation target, not excluding more 
unstable prices; 
– the inflation target would bear a variable tolerance interval up- 
and downwards (initially 2%, then 2.5%, and again reduced to 2% 
in 2006); 
– targets and tolerance intervals would be set by the National Mone-
tary Council (CMN)2 a year and a half in advance, for instance, 
the target (4.5%) and the tolerance interval (2%) for 2006 were set 
in July 2004; 
– the chosen target should be achieved over a calendar year (twelve 
months); 
– the Central Bank conducts an opinion survey with market analysts 
(Boletim Focus released on the Central Bank homepage every 
Monday) to gain expectations of so-called “rational agents”. It 
represents one of the major parameters for monetary policy deci-
sion-making (see Chart 3). In this regime, the chief monetary pol-
icy tool is the short-term interest rate (Selic) – because of antici-
pated inflation and the output gap3 – in order to make the index 
price converge with the target previously set (Farhi 2004: 82). 
                                                     
2  Members of the CMN are the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and 
the Central Bank President. 
3  A output gap is defined as the difference between the “potential output” and the 
economy’s actual output. The “potential output” would correspond to the achiev-
able production level without any mismatch between supply and demand, thus 
not causing any price raise. The inflation target “model” of the Central Bank 
would be supposedly based on a production function where the “potential output” 
could not exceed GDP growth limit of 3.5%. 
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Inflation remained within the tolerance limits in 1999 and 2000 and 
exceeded them in the following years, especially in 2002 and 2003.4 
The inflation acceleration was basically determined by the supply 
shock represented by the currency devaluation and its dissemination 
mechanisms. These implied higher price indexes in late 2002, during 
the election of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (see Chart 3 and 1). 
Indexed prices made it difficult to reduce the inflation rate. With the 
recovery of economic growth at international and domestic levels in 
2004, agricultural and industrial commodities experienced a price 
increase shock and profit margins of corporations had little relative 
room for recovery. Nonetheless, the inflation rate remained within the 
tolerance limits. 
Thus, the peculiar Brazilian framework of pricing caused the ex-
change rate devaluation and/or other exogenous supply shocks (agri-
cultural commodity prices, oil, iron etc.) to affect most prices of goods 
and services. The strict target regime became inadequate, since only 
non-controlled price behaviour proved to be sensitive to short-term 
interest rate movements. Tradable goods prices – comprising the ex-
ports – are directly impacted by exogenous shocks such as an increase 
in international prices of commodities and semi-manufactured goods. 
Some segments, especially commodities (soya or paper pulp), manage 
to adjust internal prices which are equivalent to the currency parity. 
These sectors became insensitive to the interest rate, for they can par-
tially reduce their production share of the domestic market or even 
export their whole production to foreign markets. 
Government-regulated prices (comprised by services in their ma-
jority) are also affected by the exchange rate, but not by the interest 
rate. For instance, agreements for privatization of telecommunications 
and electricity distribution companies define yearly tariff adjustments 
based on the General Price Index – Market (IGP-M). This index 
strongly influ ences wholesale prices and it is very sensitive to supply 
shocks.5 Therefore, the yearly adjustment scheme of administered 
                                                     
4  Core inflation targets were: 8% in 1999, 6% in 2000, 4% in 2001, 3.5% in 2002, 
4% in 2003 – however, it was later adjusted to 8.5% due to its unrealistic esti-
mate –, 5.5% in 2004, and finally 4.5% in 2005 (see Chart 3). 
5  This index is calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. It is calculated from 
the weighted average of: the Wholesale Price Index (IPA-M) corresponding to 
Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 87
goods based on the IGP-M accrued in past twelve months created an 
important vector of inflationary inertia and a pass-through of currency 
devaluation, and other exogenous shocks, on domestic prices. Goods 
of which prices are government-monitored are also insensitive to in-
terest rates for their own adjustment mechanisms. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Inflation Target System (Sistema de Metas para a 
Inflação <http://www.bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
As to non-tradable goods prices (in the domestic market), they adjust 
themselves to the aggregate demand caused by the interest rates in-
crease by means of the reduction of (wage) costs and profit margins. 
Nevertheless, these prices account for just one third of IPCA – 
adopted as the reference index to determine and to calculate the infla-
tion target – whereas the aggregate share of tradable and administered 
goods reaches approx. 69%. Therefore, the monetary policy needs to 
be extremely restrictive to constrain the demand, so that a price reduc-
tion in the non-tradable goods sector and in a few segments of the 
tradable goods sector offsets the adjustments of government-regulated 
prices and some tradable goods insensitive to interest rate variations. 
During this period, the short-term real interest rate (Selic), less the 
accrued inflation of the previous twelve months, consistently re-
mained at a nearly 10% level except for the year 2003 (see Chart 4). 
A overly short-term horizon for the achievement of the target 
(twelve months) also contributed to maintaining a restrictive monetary 
policy. This fact had a negative impact on growth, employment, in-
                                                                                                                  
60%, the Consumer Price Index (IPC-M) corresponding to 30% and the National 
Cost-of-Construction Index (INCC-M) corresponding to 10%. 
Chart 3 - Inflation Target and Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA)
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vestment recovery, as well as on the evolution of public debt stock, 
despite continuous and increasing fiscal surpluses. 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Inflation Target System (Sistema de Metas para a 
Inflação <http://www.bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
In addition to these limitations of the inflation targeting regime as-
sociated with a peculiar pricing mechanism, the slight signs of recov-
ery of consumers’ purchasing power fostered the consumption-credit 
market in 2004 and reduced the efficacy of the high interest rate pol-
icy in the short run. First, the banking system extended loan terms as a 
result of increased confidence in debtors’ solvency (individuals or 
corporations). In this scenario, the gradual Selic rate increase is offset 
by a term extension of consumer loans which keeps instalments al-
most constant. Secondly, the securitization of receivables was con-
solidated with the economic expansion and sales growth, leading to 
increased corporate liquidity. Thirdly, credit expansion by means of 
payroll check discount made possible the entry of new consumers into 
the market, such as retirees and those who managed to refinance their 
debt (overdraft protection agreement, for instance) for this credit mo-
dality, and to later expand their consumption. Fourthly, the strategic 
partnership between retail corporations and the financial sector – Pão 
de Açúcar-Itaú, Panashop-HSBC, and Casas Bahia-Bradesco – in-
creased the potential commitment of retailers to consumption credit 
and stimulated sales (Barros/Baer 2004). In spite of these innovations 
in the consumption credit segment the Brazilian loans volume remains 
extremely low, i.e. approx. 26.3% of GDP in December 2004, marked 
Chart 4 - Reference Interest Rate (SELIC) and Inflation (IPCA)
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by short maturity and extremely high interest rates. This makes the 
current banking system unfit for economic development funding.6 
The inflation measured by IPCA should converge with the 5.1% 
adjusted target7 in 2005. Market analysts, however, still estimate an 
inflation rate of approx. 6%. Thus, the Monetary Policy Committee 
(Copom) of the Central Bank started to raise the short-term interest 
rate in September 2004 in order to slow down growth (from 5.2% in 
2004 to approx. 3.5% in 2005).8 This perpetuates the low and discon-
tinuous growth evidenced by the Brazilian economy since the 1980s 
(see Chart 5). In this scenario, the private sector continues to show 
low levels of investment rates (18% of GDP in 2003), especially in the  
Source: IBGE Foundation <http://www.ibge.gov.br>. 
 
domestic market-oriented industries, despite a relative amplification of 
the investment rate in 2004. Major obstacles to investments result 
from uncertainties regarding the economy’s prospects associated with 
                                                     
6  The credit-GDP ratio was 37% in 1995. See Cardim de Carvalho (2005). Accord-
ing to the Central Bank in December 2004 average interest rates on loans were 
31% per year to the corporate sector and 61.5% per year to individuals. 
7  In 23 September 2004 the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) decided to adopt 
a 5.1% adjusted target for 2005 since it seemed unrealistic to pursue the 4.5% tar-
get. 
8  Such deceleration will not necessarily lead to a recession, although the GDP 
growth rate fell to 0.4% in the forth quarter of 2004. As the current levels of in-
ternational liquidity persist, along with low interest rates in major markets, and 
the world trade growth rate reaches approx. 21% per year, the dynamism of the 
Brazilian economy may proceed at approx. 3,5%, despite the macroeconomic 
policy and infrastructure bottlenecks. In this case, a longer cycle may prevail in 
the following two or three years, but with low growth rates. However, it is appar-
ently not enough to foster the social and economic development of the country. 
Chart 5 - GDP and Gross Domestic Investment Variation Rate
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structural factors (external vulnerability, high public debt stock, high 
interest rates), amplified by the excessively orthodox management of 
the macroeconomic policy. As long as there is no evidence of sus-
tained economic growth, chances for a new private investment cycle 
are apparently poor. Frustration with the domestic market expansion 
potential is still very strong in investors’ minds. Under these circum-
stances, investments have been determined by very solid comparative 
advantages, such as in the agribusiness (soya, meat, paper and cellu-
loses etc.); the competition dynamics which require continuous in-
vestment, for instance, in telecommunications and retailer distribution; 
international price behaviour (mining, iron metallurgy and petrochem-
icals). Furthermore, the squeezing of some production chains and the 
investment stagnation caused bottlenecks in the supply chain. These 
bottlenecks can only be solved through higher expenditures in the 
development of new capacities, which demand proper policies for 
credit provision, trade and technological innovation. The development 
of competitive advantages requires state policies which are able to 
sustain higher investment rates in relation to GDP and, simultane-
ously, to bypass balance-of-payment constraints through an acceler-
ated expansion of net exports (Resende 2004). Needless to say, these 
policies are antagonistic to the current policies based on inflation tar-
get, currency valuation, and fiscal surpluses. 
In sum, concentrated market structures capable of transferring in-
ternational price changes, high indexation levels, and a consumption-
oriented credit market forced significant relative price changes. These 
changes lead to higher inflation rates in an economy like the Brazilian 
one, without necessarily causing a price rise in every sector.9 Never-
theless, the inflation targeting system governing the monetary policy 
decision-making determines the maintenance of real interest rates at 
approx. 10% per year. This combination of inflation targeting regime 
and floating exchange rate subject to great fluctuations proved to be 
extremely perverse and led to recurrent stop and go cycles. It has also 
made sustainable growth difficult by discouraging investment, with 
negative impact on the public debt and the employment rate. 
                                                     
9  Cf. Fraga et al. (2003): “the volatility of all variables – inflation, exchange rate, 
output, and interest rate – and the inflation level are higher in emerging econo-
mies in comparison with those observed in developed economies”. 
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3. Fiscal Surplus and Reduction of Public Indebtedness 
In the beginning of the Real Plan the financial status of the Brazilian 
public sector was very good. The previous administration had con-
ducted a huge budget and public indebtedness adjustment. A primary 
surplus of 2.6% of the GDP was observed and the public sector net 
debt was relatively reduced in relation to GDP in 1993 (Belluzzo/ 
Almeida 2002). Nonetheless, during the first phase of the Real Plan 
(1994-1998), the federal administration unloaded the burden of the 
monetary policy and later that of the exchange devaluation on the 
public sector as a whole. The public debt stock and interest payment 
rose dramatically. In the period 1994-1997, the net capital inflow led 
to an expansion of foreign liabilities and of Central Bank reserves. 
The monetary sterilization policy implemented by the Central Bank 
led to a domestic public debt increase. During the phase of net capital 
outflow, the reserve dropdown was followed by an interest rate rise. 
This fact made debt service grow and determined a rapid increase in 
the net public debt-GDP ratio (see Chart 6). These factors were re-
sponsible for steadily feeding the net debt, and not excessive public 
expenditures. Therefore, the domestic public debt evolution bears a 
phenomenon of financial and monetary nature with certain serious 
fiscal implications.  
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series – (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
Chart 6 - Net Debt of the Public Sector (% GDP)
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Finally, monetary and exchange policies in a context of finance liber-
alization resulted in higher fiscal and financial fragilty in the public 
sector. Since a large amount of the debt was indexed to the short-term 
interest rate (Selic) and to the exchange rate, its stock was extremely 
volatile. The attempt to reduce the net public debt in relation to the 
GDP – converted into a goal together with the IMF – made fiscal pol-
icy implementation perverse. By means of high interest rates, low 
GDP growth rates, and a floating exchange rate, the strategy of reduc-
ing public debt started to require increasing primary surpluses10 and, 
therefore, a relative squeezing of social expenditures and an absolute 
squeezing of public infrastructure investments. 
After IMF resource inflow in November 1998 the primary balance 
of public accounts at three federative levels of government – federal, 
state, and local – became one of the macroeconomic policy priori-
ties.11 In order to establish a pattern of budget balance at all levels of 
government – Federation, States and municipalities – different pro-
grams were implemented: the Incentive Program for the Reduction of 
the State Public Sector in Banking Activities (Circular No 2.742 dd. 
1997 issued by the Central Bank), Program for Support and Restruc-
turing of State Fiscal Adjustment (Law Nº 9.496 dd. 11 September 
1997) followed by the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Supplementary 
Law No 101 dd. 4 May 2000) and the Law on Fiscal Crimes (Law 
No 10.028 dd. 19 October 2000). 
The fiscal adjustment aimed at increasing revenues and decreasing 
expenditures to save resources for the achievement of fiscal surplus 
and public debt reduction targets. The domestic tax burden rose from 
29.33% to 34.01% of GDP corresponding to a 4.68% increase in the 
period 1998-2003. Afonso/Araújo (2005: 7, 20) showed that the taxa-
tion increase “has not resulted in an equal variation in expenditures on 
goods and services by the public sector”. The government demand 
dropped from 21.93% in 1998 to 21.59% of GDP in 2003 and invest-
ment expenditures fell from 2.8% to 1.7% of GDP in this same period. 
Resources were partially allocated for payment of social benefits (in-
come transfers). However, its majority was allocated for payment of 
                                                     
10  Fiscal surplus targets were increased from 2.8% in 1999 to 3.5% in 2001; 3.75% 
in 2002; 4.25% in 2003; and 4.5% in 2004. 
11  Since then the Brazilian government has signed four agreements with the IMF 
totalling US$ 80.1 billion and has drawn US$ 58 billion (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Agreements signed between the Brazilian government and the IMF 
 1998 
(a) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(b) 
2006 
(b) 
2007 
(b) 
Total 
Loans 
US billion 19,9 - - 18,5 26,2 15,5 - - - - 80,1 
Drawn Value 
US$ billion 14,4 - - 17,4 26,2 0     58,0 
Drafts 
US$ millions 
5.212 6.783 0 8.044 18.709 19.260 0    58.000 
Paid interests  
US$ millions 
 517 389 159 550 1.189 1.244 1.196 627 279 6.150 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exfin2. cfm?memberKey1=90&date1Key=2005%2D01%2D31>. 
Notes: a) Brazil received funding from other international organisms along with IMF loans totalling US$ 41.5 billion;  
b) An estimate. 
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the public debt service of which interest rates rose from 5.19% to 
7.77% of GDP. 
In fact, since 1996 the Brazilian public sector has disbursed inter-
est payments of approx. 7% of GDP, except for 1997, when it dropped 
to 5% of GDP, and during crises in 1999 and early 2003 when it rose 
to 15% of GDP (see Chart 7). Not only exchange and monetary poli-
cies immobilized fiscal policy, but also implied a transfer of increas-
ing interests to creditors. This fact deteriorated domestic income dis-
tribution (the richest 10% population absorb 44% of the domestic 
income whereas the poorest 10% absorb just 1%). 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series – (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>. 
 
The Federation, States, municipalities, and state-run companies 
achieved a primary surplus (revenues less expenditures, excluding 
interest payments) of 81 billion Reals during 2004. This value corre-
sponds to 4.6% of GDP above the target set by the government (4.5%) 
and above that agreed with the IMF (4.25%). This primary result was 
enough to pay 63% of interests which reached 128.3 billion Reals that 
year corresponding to 7.3% of GDP (see Chart 7). Thus, the public 
sector nominal deficit was 47.1 billion Reals corresponding to 2.7% of 
GDP. The net debt stock of the public sector rose from R$ 913.1 bil-
lion in December 2003 to R$ 957 billion in December 2004. Nonethe-
less, the public debt-GDP ratio fell from 57.2% to 51.8% in this same 
period (see Chart 6). This 5.4 percentage point drop interrupted an 
uptrend observed since 1995. However, it implied neither any im-
provements in the funding framework of the Brazilian state, nor a 
route to public debt sustainability in the medium run (three to five 
Chart 7 - Interest Payments and Primary Result (accrued in 12 months, as a 
percentage of the GDP)
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years), despite the generation of high and increasing primary sur-
pluses. Crucial factors for explaining this performance were the eco-
nomic growth estimated at 5.25, a lower interest rate in the period 
April-August 2004 (stable at 16% per year), and the currency appre-
ciation along with fiscal restriction.12 
Some improvements have been observed in the debt management: 
exchange rate-indexed bonds declined from 20.5% of total in Decem-
ber 2003 to 9.3% in December 2004; Selic post-fixed bonds fell from 
55.5% to 54% in this same period; and pre-fixed bonds rose from 
11.4% to 19%. This facilitated the monetary policy management. 
Nevertheless, despite efforts made by authorities, the relationship 
between the Central Bank and the banking system has changed little 
concerning public bond liquidity and turnover.13 These assets kept 
their basic feature of a quasi-currency (transactions concentrated in 
extremely short terms) and the average maturation of bonds issued by 
the Central Bank was 15.8 months and that of bonds issued by the 
Treasury was 11.2 months in December 2004. Therefore, a flight risk 
against the Real resulting from any foreign disturbance remained la-
tent. 
In addition to the restricting character of the fiscal policy, an in-
creasing sacrifice in public investment is observed. Its lowest level 
since 1984 was recorded in the period 2003-2004. The Treasury – sup-
ported by “technical” arguments found in the IMF agreement – pur-
sues an increasing fiscal surplus and restricts infrastructure expendi-
tures. This represents a hindrance to tackling economic infrastructure 
bottlenecks: a precarious road network, insufficient railway capacity, 
port saturation, difficulties in expanding electricity generation and 
basic sanitation systems. However, infrastructure expansion represents 
one of the major requirements for ensuring sustained growth. Consid-
ering the sector nature – long maturation term and uncertain imple-
mentation costs, extensive capital requirements and amortization pe-
                                                     
12  Prospects for 2005 do not seem very optimistic. These factors shall be less favor-
able except for the exchange rate. The reference interest rate has been rising since 
September 2004 and a GDP deceleration is estimated at approx. 3.5%. A relevant 
discussion on the domestic public debt renegotiation (80% of the GDP) is beyond 
the scope of this paper. As an example see Carvalho (2005). 
13  It is still too early to evaluate impacts of a change in taxation rules of investment 
funds according to their maturation period effective since early 2005. 
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riod, low economic return, environmental risks – the expansion of 
these investments shall be conducted without the decisive participa-
tion of the public sector. This is a contradiction in view of the current 
magnitude of the interest rate and fiscal surplus.14 
The clearly regressive fiscal policy and successive fiscal adjust-
ments have not even allowed compensatory policies to struggle 
against unemployment, social scarcity (education, healthcare, land 
reform etc.) and to tackle poverty problems. Sustained economic 
growth emerges as a necessary condition for facing these matters by 
means of employment expansion, wage recovery, and further taxation 
(Salm 2005). In 2004 growth recovery led to a decrease in the unem-
ployment rate of the economically active population from 13.1% in 
April to 9.6% in December (see Chart 8). Precarious labor conditions 
increased in metropolitan areas despite this unemployment rate drop. 
The number of employees working 40 hours a week and earning less 
than a minimum wage was 2.7 million in December 2004 according to 
the Employment Monthly Survey by IBGE. This figure was 2 million 
in March 2002. Seven hundred and twenty thousand people were 
added to the number of underpaid employees corresponding to 36% 
(Soares 2005). Thus, the ratio between underpaid workers and total 
workers rose from 8.7% to 14% in the same period. This increase in 
underpaid employees represents the most perverse face of workers’ 
real average income decline. It dropped consecutively for the seventh 
year (see Chart 9). Accrued income losses reached 18.8% in the pe-
riod 1996-2003. 
 
 
                                                     
14  Some sectors support the participation of private capital in developing a physical 
infrastructure in the country in view of funding and fiscal restrictions in the pub-
lic sector which limits its investment capacity. Nevertheless, private capital re-
quires the establishment of a secure legal environment with reduced risks to per-
forming infrastructure investments. This is the reason behind the debate on the 
role of Regulatory Agencies, the Bankruptcy Law, and the Public-Private Sector 
Partnership. However, the existence of a stable legal environment does not ex-
clude the conflict between investments in limited or uncertain profitability fields 
and the high level of the real interest rate. It remains an obstacle to expanding  
infrastructure expenditures. The historic experience seems to suggest that the  
recovery of such investments, even in partnerships with the private sector, re-
quires the structuring of coordination and support mechanisms (credit, tax) as 
well as long-term economic prospects (Biasoto 2004). 
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Source: IBGE Foundation – Monthly Employment Survey (a new methodology since 
March 2002) <http://www.ibge.gov.br>. 
 
Source: IBGE Foundatin – National Household Sample Survey <http://www. 
ibge.gov.br>. 
Note: This survey was not conducted in the years of 1994 and 2000. 
 
Although the labor market has shown a recovery – new positions and 
formal employment –, the economic recovery did not reflect an aver-
age increase in purchasing power. This means that new positions paid 
lower wages. Moreover, more members of the same family had to find 
a job as an attempt to offset the income loss by the head of the family. 
This phenomenon helps explain the increase in underpaid workers, 
since these people tend to accept lower waged-jobs and frequently 
poorer work conditions. According to the IBGE survey the majority of 
this group is comprised of women, non-white workers and those with-
out a formal contract or self-employed ones (young and elderly peo-
ple). Unfortunately, this mismatch between the income and occupation 
evolution shall not be relieved, because the Central Bank promotes a 
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deceleration in productive activities by means of interest rate increase 
to achieve the inflation target. This restricts any prospects in increas-
ing workers’ employment and income. 
The persistent stop-and-go dynamics amplifies the obstacles to re-
versing the picture on social exclusion which is aggravated not only 
by poor economic growth, but also by changes imposed by the mod-
ernization of the productive structure itself as a consequence of the 
dismantling of institutions of the so-called “wage society” – increase 
in insecure work contracts, non-affiliation to trade unions, subcon-
tracting, employment deindustrialization, growth in personal ser-
vices –, as well as extremely low wages. Under these circumstances, 
poverty and social exclusion affect larger and larger portions of the 
working class. 
In conclusion, financial liberalization and IMF rules force an in-
creasing fiscal surplus to pay the public indebtedness (foreign and 
domestic) which perpetuates the financial fragility of the public sector 
and hinders infrastructure funding and expansion of social expendi-
tures. The macroeconomic model makes it very hard, if not impossi-
ble, for the implementation of an autonomous fiscal policy which 
characterizes a modern public sector able to sustain and foster an ex-
pansion in income, employment, physical infrastructure, universaliza-
tion of public policies, and income redistribution. 
 
4. Final Considerations 
There is an intense debate over the improvement of the macroeco-
nomic model in the country. The flexibilization of strict inflation tar-
gets is suggested by adopting stable targets and not declining ones 
over time, the extension of terms to achieve them, the pursue of a core 
target and not the full index, and so on. These changes would allow a 
lower real interest rate, and reduce the deleterious effects on produc-
tion, employment, investments, public debt stock, and exchange rate. 
As to the elevated fiscal surplus targets, the IMF itself signaled a 
US$ 1 billion-drop per year in the primary surplus for the period 
2005-2007 in order to make possible infrastructure investment pro-
jects (roads, ports etc.) approved by its supervisory team. Lower real 
interest rates and further public investments would sustain economic 
growth and meet expectations of public debt solvency (a drop in the 
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net public debt-GDP ratio over time). Finally, the debate on how to 
restrict currency overvaluation considers the introduction of a Finan-
cial Transactions Tax (IOF) on short-term foreign currency transac-
tions to restrict speculative capital inflow attracted by high interest 
rates. Reserve purchase and derivative transactions by the Treasury 
and the Central Bank would be insufficient to constrain the apprecia-
tion of the Brazilian currency with future impacts on the trade balance 
and external adjustment.15 
Finally, in the 1990s, capital account liberalization and financial 
deregulation were defended as policies capable of mitigating income 
and consumption fluctuations in developing countries. The assumption 
was that net foreign capital inflows would foster growth and employ-
ment. The reality proved to be totally different. The emerging econo-
mies – Mexico, Eastern Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and 
so on – faced several financial and currency crises since international 
financial markets were subject to liquidity constraint and expansion 
cycles. 
                                                     
15  A former president of the Central Bank, Affonso Celso Pastore, supports the idea 
that the Real has been appreciating with the short-term capital inflow. This may 
both reduce the current account balance and hinder the implementation of the 
monetary policy. Foreign investors amplify the demand for CDI (Interbanking 
Certificate of Deposit) contracts or 180 to 360-day swap contracts at the Futures 
and Goods Stock Exchange (BM&F) by raising their prices and reducing the 
long-term interest rates. Thus, capital movements introduce a distortion into the 
interest rate framework: although the Central Bank raises the short-term interest 
rate, capital inflows reduce the long-term interest rate and weaken the efficacy of 
the monetary policy. The use of the IOF on capital inflows was then suggested 
(Lamucci 2005). The introduction of the IOF does not initially seem enough to 
restrict the excessive valuation of the Real since the appreciation trend has been 
determined by derivative transactions abroad and at the BM&F, i.e. merely vir-
tual transactions, without any movement of net capital inflows. The interruption 
of this speculative movement would require more radical decisions such as: pro-
hibition of derivative transactions at the BM&F by foreign investors; margin rise 
in derivative transactions by reducing their leverage level; forcing banks to im-
pose higher capitalization in foreign currency transactions and derivatives; taxa-
tion of capital gains from speculation and arbitrage against the dollar etc. (Farhi 
2005; Guimarães 2005). Decisions announced by the Central Bank on the eve-
ning of 4th March 2005 signalled the opposite direction, i.e. the full convertibility 
of the Real. The deepening of the Brazilian currency market deregulation facili-
tates foreign currency transactions by domestic and international investors and 
increases safety and speculative and arbitrage movements, both in periods of high 
international liquidity and in periods of high risk aversion. See also Cardim de 
Carvalho/Sicsú (2004). 
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From 1999 on, developing countries started to show current ac-
count surpluses led by Asian and oil-producing countries. Experiences 
in Asian countries (China, Korea, Hong Kong, India, and Thailand) 
seem to show that the achievement of positive trade balances and re-
serve accumulation have enabled technological progress, as well as 
the implementation of laxer monetary policies favoring the expansion 
of domestic credit, production and employment. Reserve accumula-
tion – through high trade balances and non-borrowing of new loans – 
meets the demand for strong currency liquidity and ensures exchange 
rate stability. Finally, the defense of a devaluated exchange rate, cur-
rent account surpluses, and high reserve accumulation has become 
crucial in a world of high capital mobility and asymmetry between 
currencies (Belluzzo/Carneiro 2004). This seems to demonstrate that 
strong national states can accomplish development projects if they 
strengthen their autonomy, i.e. not depending on international finan-
cial markets. 
As a counterpart, developing countries have become net exporters 
of financial resources to developed economies (Cintra/Farhi 2003). 
Developing economies transferred US$ 1.23 trillion in the period 
1998-2004, according to the IMF (2004). Because of risk asymmetry, 
foreign fundraising by these countries pay 3%-4% interest on their 
reserve stocks (invested in T-bonds or in bonds of developed coun-
tries’ corporations). 
Under these circumstances, preventive controls on capital inflows 
and outflows need to return to the economic agenda in order to allow 
more room for manoeuvre in the conduct of domestic macroeconomic 
policies. As pointed out by The Economist (May 3, 2003: 4):  
[…] the global capital market is a turbulent and dangerous place, espe-
cially for poorly developed economies that may be ill-equipped to navi-
gate it. […] for some countries, imposing certain kinds of control on 
capital will be wiser than making no preparations at all.  
This stance survives even in surprising corners. Some IMF representa-
tives came to the conclusion that “there is little evidence that the fi-
nancial integration has helped developing countries stabilize fluctua-
tions in consumption growth” (Prasad et al. 2003). Only industrial 
countries with large domestic financial markets and convertible cur-
rencies benefited from this situation. 
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Other studies, such as that conducted by Epstein et al. (2003) show 
that the countries which continued to control capital flows and the 
exchange rate succeeded in achieving higher growth rates, lower pro-
duction and income fluctuation, and reduced vulnerability in external 
accounts. The most successful countries were Chile, India, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and China. By pursuing this path, the Argentinean 
and Colombian administrations implemented preventive controls on 
short-term capital flows. Capital that was not assigned for direct in-
vestment in companies or foreign trade will have to remain at least 
180 days within the country. The purpose is to prevent an excessive 
appreciation of the domestic currency which jeopardizes exports. 
An IMF report acknowledges that liberalizing reforms imple-
mented by Latin American countries – trade and capital account liber-
alization, deregulation of domestic financial systems, and state reform 
– did not achieve their goals in terms of growth in their gross domestic 
product, their balance of payment, and their public sector. As Singh 
et al. (2005) remark:  
Few countries succeeded in managing the transition – from current ac-
count deficit with fixed exchange rate – , especially in an environment of 
high international capital mobility. [...] The imposition of controls on ca-
pital inflows may have played a role in Chile. 
The Brazilian macroeconomic framework – floating exchange rates, 
high real interest rate, along with decreasing quantitative targets for 
inflation and fiscal surpluses – ensured monetary stability, a tempo-
rary adjustment of external accounts, a relative reduction of the public 
debt, and preservation of financial wealth in the domestic currency 
though in the short term. It is responsible for triggering expansion and 
contraction cycles. However, it does not seem able to foster social and 
economic development by expanding employment, raising real wages, 
and improving income distribution. Based on the Brazilian macroeco-
nomic equation, up to the present moment, there is no historic experi-
ence of sustained development.16 Contrary to common beliefs of con-
ventional theory, the floating exchange rate does not lead to higher 
autonomy in fiscal and monetary policies under conditions of financial 
                                                     
16  The Brazilian experience is not unique. For a criticism of the Chilean model, see 
Valdivia (2004) and Carcanholo (2004); for the Mexican model, see Palma 
(2003). 
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liberalization, high external liabilities and low international reserves. 
Even when the current account deficit is reduced, the floating ex-
change rate does not exclude an exchange risk and the Central Bank is 
still forced to intervene (for appreciation or devaluation). This fact has 
an impact on the public debt stock and requires increasing fiscal sur-
pluses (Carneiro 2004). The use of a restrictive monetary policy to 
mitigate the effects of the floating exchange rate on domestic prices 
also increases the required funding by the public sector. In addition, it 
also increases the opportunity cost for private investments. Finally, the 
perverse relationship between exchange, monetary, and fiscal policies 
govern the stop-and-go behaviour of the GDP and have deleterious 
impacts on employment and income distribution. 
Contrary to the statement by the Minister of Finance Antonio 
Palocci, that “experiments failed in Brazil”, boldness would be re-
quired to interrupt the vicious circle of the “light failure” of the Brazil-
ian economy: even if it does not enter into default, it does not create 
development either. This seems to demand the build-up of an alterna-
tive political coalition – founded on production and labor interests – in 
order to overcome the alliance of creditors which is the basis of the 
Brazilian current political and economic power. 
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